Abstract. In recent years, intuitionistic logic and type systems have been used in numerous computational systems as frameworks for the specification of natural deduction proof systems. As we shall illustrate here, linear logic can be used similarly to specify the more general setting of sequent calculus proof systems. Linear logic's meta theory can be used also to analyze properties of a specified object-level proof system. We shall present several example encodings of sequent calculus proof systems using the Forum presentation of linear logic. Since the object-level encodings result in logic programs (in the sense of Forum), various aspects of object-level proof systems can be automated. §1. Introduction. Logics and type systems have been exploited in recent years as frameworks for the specification of deduction in a number of logics. Such meta logics or logical frameworks have generally been based on intuitionistic logic in which quantification at (non-predicate) higher-order types is available. Identifying a framework that allows the specification of a wide range of logics has proved to be most practical since a single implementation of such a framework can then be used to provide various degrees of automation of object-logics. For example, Isabelle [26] and λProlog [25] are implementations of an intuitionistic logic subset of Church's Simple Theory of Types, while Elf [27] is an implementation of a dependently typed λ-calculus [16] . These computer systems have been used as meta languages to automate various aspects of various logics.
§1. Introduction. Logics and type systems have been exploited in recent years as frameworks for the specification of deduction in a number of logics. Such meta logics or logical frameworks have generally been based on intuitionistic logic in which quantification at (non-predicate) higher-order types is available. Identifying a framework that allows the specification of a wide range of logics has proved to be most practical since a single implementation of such a framework can then be used to provide various degrees of automation of object-logics. For example, Isabelle [26] and λProlog [25] are implementations of an intuitionistic logic subset of Church's Simple Theory of Types, while Elf [27] is an implementation of a dependently typed λ-calculus [16] . These computer systems have been used as meta languages to automate various aspects of various logics.
Features of a meta-logic are often directly inherited by any object-logic. This inheritance can be, at times, a great asset. For example, if the meta-logic is rich enough to include λ-bindings in its syntax and to provide α and β conversion as part of its equality of syntax (as is the case for the systems mentioned above), the object-logics immediately inherit such simple and declarative treatments of binding constructs and substitutions. On the other hand, features of the meta-logic can limit the kinds of object-logics that can be directly and naturally encoded. For example, the structural rules of an intuitionistic meta-logic (weakening and contraction) are also inherited making it difficult to have natural encodings of any logic for which these structural rules are not intended. Also, intuitionistic logic does not have an involutive negation, making it difficult to address directly dualities in object-logics.
In this paper, we make use of linear logic as a meta-logic and find that we can specify a variety of proof systems for object-level systems. By making use of classical linear logic, we are able to capture not only natural deduction proof systems but also many sequent calculus proof systems. We will present our scheme for encoding proof systems in linear logic and show several examples of making such specifications. Since the encodings of such logical systems are natural and direct the rich meta-theory of linear logic can be used to drawing conclusions about the object-level proof systems, and we illustrate such reasoning as well.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an introduction to linear logic and Forum. Section 3 shows the representation of sequents and inference rules, while Forum encodings of the well-known proof systems for linear, classical and intuitionistic logics are presented in Section 4. Using the meta-theory, it is possible to prove the collapsing of some modal prefixes for the specified classical and intuitionistic systems. In Section 5 other sequent calculus for these logics are encoded where modal prefixes collapse less dramatically. In order to show how to represent systems that make use of polarities, Section 6 presents an encoding of the so called Logic of Unity (LU ) proof system. Section 7 provides an overview of how one might proof search for both Forum and encoded object-level proof systems. We conclude and discuss some future research directions in Section 8.
Our main purpose in this paper is to illustrate via examples how linear logic can be used to both specify and reason about object-level sequent proof systems. We shall do this largely by presenting a series of examples. More extensive discussion of the material in this paper can be found in the PhD dissertation of the second author [28] . §2. Overview of Linear Logic and Forum. Linear Logic [13] for the additive version of these connectives; −• for linear implication, and ∀ and ∃ for universal and existential quantification. We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the sequent calculus presentation of linear logic and with its basic properties.
2.1. The Forum presentation of linear logic. The connectives of linear logic can be classified as synchronous and asynchronous [2] depending on whether or not the right introduction rule for that connective needs to "synchronize" with its surrounding context. The de Morgan dual of a connective in one of these classes yields a connective in the other class. Given this division of connectives, Miller proposed . . . . . . . . , ⊥, &, , −•, and ∀, along with the intuitionistic version of implication (B ⇒ C denotes ! B −• C). The synchronous connectives are implicitly available in Forum since a two sided sequent is used: connectives appearing on the left of the sequent arrow behave synchronously. Proof search in the Forum presentation of linear logic resembles the search involved in logic programming [24, 22] : introducing asynchronous connectives corresponds to goal-directed search and introducing synchronous connectives corresponds to backchaining over logic program clauses.
Forum is a presentation of all of linear logic since it contains a complete set of connectives. The connectives missing from Forum are directly definable using the following logical equivalences: 
Here, the equivalence B ≡ C means that the universal closure of the expression
To help make the connection between proof search in Forum and logic programming, it is useful to introduce the notions of goal and clause into Forum. A formula is a Forum clause if it is of the form B n , where n ≥ 0 and each B i is an atom. If n = 0 then we write the head as simply ⊥ and say that the head is empty. A flat clause is essentially a clause of the LinLog system [2] except that heads of flat clauses may be empty. It will be the case that all formulas used to specify sequent calculus inferences rules in this paper will be flat Forum clauses. As in Church's Simple Theory of Types [6] , both terms and formulas are built using a simply typed λ-calculus. We assume the usual rules of α, β, and η-conversion and we identify terms and formulas up to α-conversion. A term is λ-normal if it contains no β and no η redexes. All terms are λ-convertible to a term in λ-normal form, and such a term is unique up to α-conversion. The substitution notation B[t/x] denotes the λ-normal form of the β-redex (λx.B)t. Following [6] , we shall also assume that formulas of Forum have type o.
2.2.
Proof system for Forum. The proof system for Forum, F, is given in Figure 1 We use the turnstile symbol as the mathematical-level judgment that a sequent is provable: that is, ∆ Γ means that the two-sided sequent ∆ −→ Γ has a linear logic proof. The following correctness theorem for F is given in [23] and is based on the focusing result of Andreoli in [2] . We shall use the term backchaining to refer to an application of either the decide or the decide! inference rule followed by a series of applications of leftintroduction rules (reading a proof bottom-up). This notion of backchaining generalizes the usual notion found in the logic programming literature.
When presenting examples of Forum code we often use •− and ⇒ to be the converses of −• and ⇐ since they provide a more natural operational reading of clauses (similar to the use of :-in Prolog). We will assume that when parsing expressions, Figure 1 . The F proof system. The rule ∀R has the proviso that y is not declared in the signature Σ, and the rule ∀L has the proviso that t is a Σ-term of type τ . In &L i , i = 1 or i = 2.
rules. Of course, a clause may have multiple, top-level implications. In this case, the surrounding context must be manipulated properly to prove the sub-goals that arise in backchaining. Consider a clause of the form [5] used Forum to present the semantics of a RISC processor and Chakravarty [4] used it to specify the logical and operational semantics of a parallel programming language. A specification of a sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic was given by Miller in [23] : that example was improved by Ricci [30] , where a proof system for classical logic was also given. The examples in [23, 30] are significantly generalized in this paper. §3. Representing sequents and inference rules. Since we now wish to represent one logic and proof system within another, we need to distinguish between the meta-logic, namely, linear logic as presented by Forum, and the various object-logics for which we wish to specify sequent proof systems. Formulas of the object-level will be identified with meta-level terms of type bool. Object-level logical connectives will be introduced as needed and as constructors of this type.
A two-sided sequent ∆ −→ Γ is generally restricted so that ∆ and Γ are either lists, multisets, or sets of formulas. Sets are used if all three structural rules (exchange, weakening, contraction) are implicit; multisets are used if exchange is implicit; and lists are used if no structural rule is implicit. Since our goal here is to encode object-level sequents into meta-level sequents as directly as possible, and since contexts in Forum are either multisets or sets, we will not be able to represent sequents that make use of lists. It is unlikely, for example, that non-commutative object-logics can be encoded into our linear logic meta theory along the lines we describe below.
3.1. Three schemes for encoding sequents. Consider the well known, two-sided sequent proof systems for classical, intuitionistic, and linear logic. A convenient distinction between these logics can be described, in part, by where the structural rules of thinning and contraction can be applied. In classical logic, these structural rules are allowed on both sides of the sequent arrow; in intuitionistic logic, no structural rules are allowed on the right of the sequent arrow; and in linear logic, they are not allowed on either sides of the arrow. Thus a classical sequent is a pairing of two sets; a linear logic sequent is a pairing of two multisets; and an intuitionistic sequent is the pairing of a set (for the lefthand side) and a multiset (for the right-hand side). This discussion suggests the following representation of sequents in these three systems. Let bool be the type of object-level propositional formulas and let · and · be two meta-level predicates, both of type bool → o.
We will identify three schemes for encoding sequents. The linear scheme encodes the (object-level) sequent Often intuitionistic sequents are additionally restricted to having one formula on the right. Finally, the classical scheme encodes the sequent 
The · and · predicates are used to identify which object-level formulas appear on which side of the sequent arrow, and the ? modal is used to mark the formulas to which weakening and contraction can be applied.
3.2. Encoding additive and multiplicative inference rules. We first illustrate how to encode object-level inference rules using the linear scheme.
Consider the specification of the logical inference rules for object-level conjunction, represented here as the infix constant ∧ of type bool → bool → bool.
Consider first the additive inference rules for this connective.
These three inference rules can be specified in Forum using the clauses to the problem of finding object-level proofs for
Thus, we have successfully captured this right introduction rule for conjunction using decide! with the clause corresponding to (∧R). A similar and simpler argument shows how left introduction for ∧ is also correctly encoded using the two clauses for (∧L). Notice that the two clauses for left introduction could be written equivalently in linear logic as the one formula
(Although ⊕ is not a connective of Forum, we shall use it in this fashion in order to write two Forum clauses as one formula.) Thus, these additive rules make use of two (dual) meta-level additive connectives: & and ⊕. Now consider encoding the multiplicative version of conjunction introduction.
It is an easy matter to check that the following two clauses encode these two inference rules. 
B . (∧R)
Notice that the clause for right introduction could be written equivalently in linear logic as
Thus, these multiplicative rules make use of two (dual) meta-level multiplicative connectives: ⊗ and 
In that case, backchaining on this clause would reduce proof search of the sequent This encoding style was used in [23, 30] , for example. We shall prefer, instead, to encode inference rules without occurrences of question marks in the head of clauses since the structure of meta-level proofs often does not correspond to the structure of object-level proofs. For example, although the sequent
is provable in classical logic, there is no equivalent object-level proof for the proof displayed below. Here, signatures are not displayed in sequents, Γ = B , A ∧ B ∧ C , and Ψ is a set of formulas that contains the clause displayed above and Initial (see Section 3.4). The fact that "focus" is lost when a question mark is encountered on a formula labeling a sequent arrow means that it is much harder to control the structure of meta-level proofs and to relate them to object-level proofs.
Encoding quantifier introduction rules.
Using the quantification of higher-order types that is available in Forum, it is a simple matter to encode the inference rules for object-level quantifiers. For example, if we use the linear scheme for representing sequents, then the left and right introduction rules for object-level universal quantifier can be written as
Here, the symbol ∀ is used for both meta-level and object-level quantification: at the object-level ∀ has the type (i → Thus, these quantifier rules make use of two (dual) meta-level quantifiers.
3.4. The cut and initial rules. Up to this point, all the Forum clauses used to specify an inference figure have been such that the head of the clause has been an atom. Clauses specifying the cut and initial rules will have heads of rather different structure.
Consider specifying the initial rule (the one asserting that the sequent B −→ B is provable) using the linear scheme for encoding sequents. 
B .
will properly encode this rule. Notice that this clause has a head with two atoms (and an empty body). Similarly, the cut rule
can be specified simply as the clause
Dually to the initial rule, this clause has an empty head and two bodies.
3.5. Advantages of such encodings. The encoding of an object-level proof system as Forum clauses has certain advantages over encoding them as inference figures. For example, the Forum specifications do not deal with context explicitly and instead they focus on the formulas that are directly involved in the inference rule. The distinction between making the inference rule additive or multiplicative is achieved in inference rule figures by explicitly presenting contexts and either splitting or copying them. The Forum clause representation achieves the same distinction using meta-level additive or multiplicative connectives. Object-level quantifiers can be handled directly using the meta-level quantification. Similarly, the structural rules of contraction and thinning can be captured together using the ? modal. Finally, since the encoding of proof systems is natural and direct, we hope to be able to use the rich meta-theory of linear logic to help in drawing conclusions about object-level proof systems. An example of this kind of meta-level reason will be illustrated in Section 4.4 where a sequent calculus presentation of intuitionistic logic is transformed into a natural deduction presentation by rather simple linear logic equivalences.
Since the encodings of object-level encodings result in logic programs (in the sense of Forum) and since there is significant knowledge and tools available to provide automatic and interactive tools to compute with those logic programs, encodings such as those described here can be important for the automation of various proof systems (see Section 7).
There are, of course, some disadvantages to using linear logic as a meta-theory, the principle one being that it will not be possible to capture all proof systems, such as those for non-commutativity. As we shall see, however, significant and interesting proof systems can be encoded into linear logic and for these systems, broad avenues of meta-level reasoning and automation should be available. §4. Linear, classical, and intuitionistic logics. In this section, we present Forum encodings of well-known proof systems for linear, classical, and intuitionistic logics. Object-level linear logic will be encoded reusing the same symbols that appear at the meta-level, namely, !, ?, ⊗, We use the type i to denote object-level individuals and bool to denote objectlevel formulas (our object-logics will all be first-order). All binary connectives have type bool → bool → bool and will be written as infix. Object-level constants representing quantification are all of the second order type (i → bool) → bool: we abbreviated expressions such as ∀ i (λx.B) as simply ∀ i xB.
The three signatures Σ l , Σ c , and Σ j will denote the signatures for the objectlogics for linear, classical, and intuitionistic, respectively. We assume that each of these signatures also contains the two predicates · and · . Proofs are by structural induction of over proof structures. In all cases, proofs in Forum match closely proofs in the corresponding object-logic. where the additional formulas are defined in Figure 7 . While LJ is a strengthening of LJ, they can both prove the same object-level, intuitionistic sequents. Similarly for LK and LK. To prove the converse, we prove the following lemma by induction on the height of proofs in Forum: Let L 1 and L 2 be multisets of left-atoms and let R be a right- Notice that the inference rules for LJ 0 and LK 0 are identical except for a systematic renaming of logical constants. Thus one way to modularly describe the distinction between intuitionistic and classical logics is that the former logic assumes Pos 2 while the latter logic assumes both Pos 2 and Neg 2 . This description amounts to saying that contraction is allowed on the right and left in classical proofs but only on the left in intuitionistic proofs. Thus, the cut and initial rules show the (not surprising fact) that · and · are duals of each other. In the cases of LJ and LK, however, that duality also forces additional equivalences that cause the collapse of some of modals. As it is well known, linear logic has 7 distinct modalities, namely: the empty modality, !, ?, ? !, ! ?, ! ? !, and ? ! ?. Given the LK theory, however, all those modals collapse into just two when applied to a · -atom or a · -atom and in LJ, these modals collapse to four when applied to either the · -atoms or the · -atoms.
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Such a collapse is certainly undesirable when specifications rely on proof search: we would like to have a lot of distinctions available to help us understanding how formulas are to be used within object-level proofs. It would be far more interesting to have proof systems for intuitionistic and classical logics, for example, in which these modals would not generally collapse. Recent advances in understanding sequent calculus for these logics provide just such proof systems. We illustrate some of them in Section 5.
Natural deduction.
To illustrate an application of using meta-level reasoning to draw conclusions about an object-logic, we show how a specification for natural deduction in intuitionistic logic can be derived from a sequent calculus specification of intuitionistic logic. For simplicity, we consider a minimal logic fragment of intuitionistic logic involving only ⊃, ∩, and ∀ i : let LM be the subset of LJ from Figure 4 containing Cut, Initial, and introduction rules for those three connectives. (The disjoint sums are addressed in [23] .)
Given the equivalences arising from the cut and initial rules in LJ listed in Section 4.3, the specification for (⊃ L) is equivalent to the following formulas.
The later can be recognized as a specification of the ⊃ elimination rule. Similarly, the specification for (⊃ R) is equivalent to the following formulas. 
Continuing in such a manner, we can systematically replace all occurrences of · with occurrences of · , as listed in Figure 8 . The clauses in this figure, named NM, can easily be seen as specifying the introduction and elimination rules for this particular fragment of minimal logic. The usual specification of natural deduction rules for minimal logic [11, 16] has intuitionistic implications replacing the top-level linear implications in Figure 8 , but as observed in [17] , the choice of which implication to use for these top-level occurrences does not change the set of atomic formulas that are provable. As a result of this rather natural connection between clauses in LM and NM, the following Propositions have rather direct proofs (see [23] for details). As a consequence of the last Proposition and the correctness of representation of LM and NM, we can conclude that a formula B has a sequent calculus proof if and only if it has a natural deduction proof. §5. More refined uses of modals. For the sake of presenting examples in this section, we shall consider the fragments of intuitionistic and classical logics that involve just implication and universal quantification. Gentzen's LJ system for these two connectives is reproduced in Figure 9 .
It is well known that proof search in the intuitionistic logic of these connectives can be focused, in the sense that left-introduction rules are only applied to a distinguished formula (such focusing is a justification for backchaining in A . Figure 9 . The {⊃, ∀ i }-fragment of LJ logic programming). Danos et. al. [7] present the focused formulation of intuitionistic logic called ILU and displayed in Figure 10 . Here, sequents have the form Π; Γ −→ A where Γ and Π denote multisets, and Π containing at most one formula. The ILU proof system can be encoded in Forum by representing such sequents as Σ : ·; · −→ Π , A ; Γ and its inference rules as in Figure 11 . (If Γ is a multiset or set of object-level formulas, we write Γ and Γ to be the corresponding multiset or set of meta-level formulas resulting from applying the corresponding predicate to all formulas in Γ.) Proofs in ILU are focused in a sense that the left rules (⊃ L) and (∀ i L) can only be applied to formulas in the left linear context Π (in Forum, this is the · -formula without the ?-modal prefix). This restriction, which is enforced using modals in the Forum encoding, constrains proof search significantly. 
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⊥ ⇐ A •− ? A . Figure 11 . Specification of the calculus ILU
The two cut rules for ILU, head-cut and mid-cut, are encoded as two formulas in Figure 11 in such as way that the first implies the second: that is,
is provable in linear logic. As a result, we shall refer to the head-cut as the cut rule. Observe that from the Cut and Initial rules of ILU, we can prove the equivalence B ≡ B ⊥ but we cannot prove any equivalences between linear logic modals. Note also that ILU is equivalent to the neutral fragment of intuitionistic implicational logic of LU (see Section 6), although it was formulated in order to obtain a sequent calculus for an inductive decoration strategy (see [7] for the definition) of intuitionistic logic into linear logic. Two sequent calculi, LKQ and LKT, which provide a focused kind of proof system for classical logic are also presented in [7] . Sequents of the calculus LKQ (Figure 12 ), written as Γ −→ ∆; Π are encoded as Forum sequents Σ : ·; · −→ Π ; Γ , ∆ where Π represents a multiset containing at most one formula. Note that the rules are the same as the ones for the positive classical implicational fragment of LU (see Section 6) i.e., rules defined for positive formulas. However, LKQ cannot be identified with any proper fragment of LU since positive polarity is not preserved by the connectives ⇒ and ∀ c . Sequents of the LKT proof system (Figure 13 ), written as Γ −→ ∆; Π, are encoded as Σ : ·; · −→ Π ; Γ , ∆ , where again Π is a multiset containing at most one formula. Observe that LKT is a classical equivalent of ILU; that is, the intuitionistic calculus is obtained from LKT by the usual restriction of having exactly one formula on the right side of the sequent. LKT is equivalent to the negative fragment of classical implicational logic of LU.
In both LKQ and LKT systems there is a collapse of modal prefixes:
1. The Cut and Initial rules of LKQ prove the equivalence B ≡ ! B and the modalities collapse to four when applied to · -atoms. Thus, in LKQ the formula Pos 1 holds. 2. The Cut and Initial rules of LKT prove the equivalence B ≡ ! B and the modalities collapse to four when applied to · -atoms. Thus, in LKT the formula Neg 1 holds.
We present one final example encoding of a proof system, by picking a system that deviates from the previous one in a few details. An optimized version of (the implicational fragment of) LJ is presented in Lincoln et. al. [19] (see also [9] ). Their system, called IIL* (Figure 14) does not contain contraction or cut rules, and weakening is only allowed at the leafs of a proof; that is, when the Initial rule is applied (to atomic formulas). A key property of IIL* is that the principal formula is not duplicated in the premises of any of the rules. This 
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A ⊃ B It also requires encoding the Initial and ⊃ L rules differently than we have seen so far: the Initial rule uses the additive true, , to allow weakening, and the ⊃ L rules uses the additive conjunction, &, to copy the left context and uses a two headed clause so that the right context is not copied but is placed in the correct sequent of the premise. §6. Using polarities in proof systems. In [14], Girard introduced the sequent system LU (logic of unity) in which classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics appear as fragments. In this logic, all three of these logics keep their own characteristics but they can also communicate via formulas containing connectives mixing these logics. The key to allowing these logics to share one proof system lies in using polarities. In terms of the encoding we have presented here, this corresponds to restricting the use of Pos 2 and Neg 2 rules to positive and negative formulas respectively and to split the rules for classical, intuitionistic, and linear connectives into cases, depending on the polarities of the subformulas involved.
We proceed to encode LU into Forum as follows. The LU sequent Γ; Γ −→ ∆ ; ∆ is encoded as the Forum sequent
(Notice the different convention used between LU sequents and Forum sequents with regard to which zones in a sequent allow structural rules.) To encode the polarity of object-level, LU formulas, we introduce three meta-level predicates, Both of these formulas, however, are consequences of the Cut rule and are not needed in our encoding of LU. Similarly, the first structural rules are all simple consequences of using exponentials in encoding sequents. Finally, the fact that structural rules are allowed for positive and negative formulas is given as
Notice that if we use Cut and Initial to eliminate, say, · for · (as we did in Section 4.4), then the only non-trivial inference rules among those coding Identity and Structure rules in this presentation of LU are the (N eg) and (P os) rules.
The calculus for linear connectives in LU is equivalent to the usual one (see Fig. 2 ) and the rules do not depend on the polarities. Figure 15 specifies some polarities for classical and intuitionistic connectives (polarities for linear logic connectives can be given similarly). Many of the LU inference rules for classical and intuitionistic connectives are specified in Figure 16 . The full encoding of the LU proof system is not given here, but most of it is contained in the union of the clauses in Figures 2, 15, and 16 . Observe that the use of Forum to encode the LU proof system provides a reduced set of rules (compare e.g. Table 2 in [14] . §7. Automation of proof systems. Since the specifications of proof systems are given as clauses in Forum and since Forum can be seen as an abstract logic programming language in the sense of [24] , it is natural to ask if it is possible to turn these specifications into implementations.
One might attempt to do this using one of the available implementations of Forum [18, 20, 31] . It is, however, a simple matter to turn the specification of Forum given in Figure 1 into a naive interpreter using a logic programming language such as λProlog [25] . We will not present the details of such an implementation except to describe three aspects of it. First, it can be structured such that one inference rule in Figure 1 is translated to one λProlog clause: the resulting implementation is thus rather compact and declarative. Second, the quantification and substitution aspects of the object-logics can be captured directly using λProlog's higher-order features: using a first-order logic programming language such as Prolog would have complicated the implementation significantly. Third, a counter can be used in the clauses of this interpreter to count the number of times a decide! or a decide rule is used along a particular Forum proof branch. 
B .
⊥ •− B •− B . N •− ? N ⇐ neg(N ). P •− ? P ⇐ pos(P ). Conjunction u ∧ v ⇐ u ⇐ v ⇐ pos(u) ⊕ pos(v). u ∧ v •− u & v ⇐ notpos(u) ⇐ notpos(v). u ∧ v •− ?? v ⇐ pos(u) ⊕ pos(v). u ∧ v •− u ⊕ v ⇐ notpos(u) ⇐ notpos(v). Intuitionistic implication u ⊃ v •− ?
v . u ⊃ v ⇐ u •− v .
Quantifiers 
Figure 16. LU rules
This counter can be used to limit the size of object-level proofs that are searched and in this way, the search for object-level proofs can be controlled in a simple fashion. In general, object-level proofs can be arbitrarily large, so setting a counter such as this is certainly not a complete proof strategy. It is the case, however, that if there is a proof of height h in the object-level, then the interpreter will find a proof if the counter is set to this value. For a number of proofs that we claim below, the value of this counter is often rather small. To use this prover to prove object-level formulas, one would initialize the prover with the encoding of an object-level proof system and the encoding of the objectlevel formula. For example, attempting to prove the Forum sequent LK ⇒ B for some object-level classical logic formula B would correspond to attempting to prove B using the rules of the classical sequent calculus LK. In particular, the single formula intended as LK is the &-conjunction of the universal closure of the clauses listed in Figure 3 .
This prover can also be used determine if one collection of inference rules linearly entail other inference rules and equivalences. In particular, all the following can be proved automatically by setting the counter mentioned above to the value 3.
1. The clauses in Figure 3 encoding LK entails the clauses in Figure 4 encoding LJ, at least when these set of clauses are rewritten to use the same set of object-level constants. 2. The clauses in Figure 9 encoding a fragment of LJ entails the clauses in Figure 11 encoding the focused version of LJ called ILU. Of course, if such entailments hold, they have immediate consequences for the object-logics that they encode. For example, from the first point above, we know that any (object-level) formula provable in ILU is also provable in LJ. §8. Conclusion and future work. In this paper, we showed one way that linear logic can be used to specify some sequent calculus proof systems. We presented several examples of such an encoding and argued that such meta-logical encodings can have numerous advantages over the more standard inference figure approach. Since the encodings of the object-level proof systems are natural and direct, the rich meta-theory of linear logic can be used to draw conclusions about object-level proof systems. Because the object-level encodings result in logic programs (in the sense of Forum), the proof systems mentioned in this paper can be easily implemented and some of their properties can be automatically checked.
There is clearly much more to do now that the feasibility of using linear logic in this specification task is clear.
We have not discussed how proof objects can be specified in this setting: adding λ-calculus representations of calculi with natural deduction proofs can probably be done as it is done using an intuitionistic logic meta-theory [10] but such "single-conclusion" proofs would not work in the general sequent calculus setting.
There have been various proposals for non-commutativity variants of classical linear logic [1, 15, 29] : it would be interesting to see if these can be used to capture non-commutative object-level logics in a manner done here.
One reason to use a well understood meta-logic for specification is that it should offer ways to automate many things about inference rules. For example, it seems quite likely that the question whether or not one proof system's encoding linearly entails another proof system's encoding should be decidable, at least in many cases. It is also likely that at least important parts of the proof of cutelimination for the encoded logic might similarly be automated.
Finally, most interesting proofs that relate provability in two proof systems generally require induction. It seems natural to consider adding to linear logic forms of induction along the lines found in [21, 28] .
